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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,

REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

:

Case No. 20000591

JOHN THOMAS SNYDER,
Defendant/Appellant.

AN APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY
DEPARTMENT, The Hon. Michael K. Burton, Judge Presiding
(Trial Court Case No/ 00-201-0956)

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JOHN TOM SNYDER by and through counsel,
submits this REPLY BRIEF in further support of his appeal.
REPLY RE: ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Salt Lake County Housing Authority (hereinafter "Housing
Authority") has not filed an appeal.

The Housing Authority's

gratuitous recitation of its "issues presented for review" in Mr.
Snyder's appeal is not helpful.

The opening brief filed by

appellant, John Thomas Snyder, sets forth the issues presented
for review and now before this Court.

1

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
Mr. Snyder preserved each issue presented on appeal.

The

various matters presented were disposed of by necessary
implication by the judgment.

Each issue on appeal was presented

to and considered by the trial court.

Even if the issues had not

been formally preserved for appeal, the issues are of such
significance that the rulings and actions of the trial court were
"plain error" such that they may be considered on appeal.
Mr. Snyder presented "good cause" to continue trial.

The

trial court was erroneously informed the case was ready for
trial.

Mr. Snyder was not prepared for a trial.

Mr. Snyder was

not granted time to engage in discovery and prepare a defense.
The trial court erred by allowing an expedited hearing.
Prior to 1981, actions for unlawful detainer were granted
expedited trial dates by the rules of practice in the Utah trial
courts.

After 1981, the unlawful detainer statutes does not

provide for an expedited trial absent utilization of the
possession bond provision.
Mr. Snyder properly marshaled the evidence with regard to
the insufficient facts presented at trial.

Those facts, in their

entirety, do not support a "beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal
conviction for assault.

Mr. Snyder made no attempt to do injury.

Similarly, Mr. Snyder made no threat to do bodily injury.

All of

the facts presented at trial and now marshaled for this Court do
2

not establish a threats accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury.
The validity of the lease provisions was presented to the
trial court and is properly before this court.

The lease

provision the Housing Authority chose to include is unreasonable.
Mr. Snyder's lease provision prohibits "all illegal or criminal
activity on or near the premises'' (R. 7-8) . The provision
justifies eviction without a due process administrative
proceeding for minor offenses.
allow such a broad prohibition.

The federal regulations do not
The lease provision is too broad

and thus unreasonable.
The unlawful detainer statute provides an extremely harsh
remedy.

There must be strict compliance throughout the entire

eviction process.

The notice of eviction served upon Mr. Snyder

recites alleged criminal behavior against an employee.

The

notice of eviction refers to a lease provision prohibiting misconduct toward a tenant.

At no time did Mr. Snyder engaged in

alleged mis-conduct toward a tenant.

The eviction notice is

therefore defective, and Mr. Snyder's eviction was not justified.
Mr. Snyder was entitled to an administrative hearing to
challenge his eviction as per the terms and conditions of his
lease with the County Housing Authority.
before the trial court.

This issue was raised

Even if it were not raised below, it is

properly before this Court.

Failure to allow administrative

3

review is jurisdictional.

Jurisdictional defects may be raised

and considered at any time.
The Housing Authority may exclude certain matters from the
administrative grievance procedure based upon a due process
determination from HUD.

The exclusion from the administrative

grievance procedure is strictly linked to the judicial procedure
subject to HUD's due process determination.

In Utah, HUD's due

process determination of the judicial eviction procedure does not
apply where the plaintiff obtains possession by filing a
possession bond.

Utah's forcible detainer statute authorizes an

expedited hearing only when the plaintiff files a possession bond
and the defendant requests an expedited hearing.

HUD's due

process determination in Utah, thus, does not apply to any
expedited eviction procedures.

Therefore, in Utah there are no

exclusions from the administrative grievance procedure in any
expedited evictions involving federally subsidized housing.

Mr.

Snyder should have been allowed to avail himself of the
administrative grievance procedure.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PRESERVED EACH ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
The Housing Authority argues that various issues on appeal

were not preserved in the trial court such that this Court is
now precluded from reviewing them.

Mr. Snyder reaffirms and

reasserts that, as set forth in his opening brief, each issue on
4

appeal was presented to and properly preserved before the trial
court.
The Housing Authority contends that certain motions made by
Mr. Snyder were never ruled upon by the trial court and that
notices to submit were never submitted.1

The various matters

presented and motions made prior to and at the beginning of the
trial for a continuance, etc. were disposed of by necessary
implication by the judgment.
The Housing Authority notes, for instance, that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 233) was never submitted to the
trial court for decision.

Therefore, the Housing Authority

argues the issues therein are not properly before this Court on
appeal.

Mr. Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 233) was

never submitted for ruling because of the expedited trial and its
final judgment.

The briefing allowed under the Code of Judicial

Administration had not been completed by the time of trial.

Utah

Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501.
Mr. Snyder sets forth in his opening brief when and where
during the proceedings below the various issues raised on appeal
were presented to and considered by the trial court.

1

Brief of

Notices to submit (Rule 4-501, Ut. Code of Jud. Admin.)
were not filed because a trial was held and a judgment was
entered even before the time has expired for plaintiff to respond
to the motions and defendant reply. For instance, on May 1,
2000, Mr. Snyder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 229);
the trial was held on May 8, 2000.
5

Appellant, p. 2.

Each issue on appeal was presented to and

considered by the trial court.2
Mr. Snyder filed an Objection to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Judgement entered (R. 259). The
issues now on appeal were heard and considered by the trial court
in ruling on Mr. Snyder's Objection to Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and to Judgment.

Because the trial court had

the first opportunity to rule on the issues presented, they have
been preserved for appeal.

See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150

(Utah 1991).
Even if the issues had not been formally preserved for
appeal before the trial court, the issues are of such
significance that the rulings and actions of the trial court were
"plain error" such that they may still be considered in this
appeal.

Under a plain error analysis, an error must have

occurred, that error should have been apparent to the trial court
and the error must have caused harm.

Classic Cabinets, Inc. v.

All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 Ut. App. 88, f 17, 978 P.2d 465
(Ut. App. 1999)(citing Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 956 (Ut.
App. 1998)).

All three (3) elements necessary for a plain error

review are present in this action.

2

While the trial court may not have issued formal written
orders ruling on every issue raised by defendant, the trial court
ruled on them. If nothing else, those rulings are implicit in
the trial court holding a trial and rendering a judgment over the
clear objections of Mr. Snyder.
6

II.

JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PRESENTED "GOOD CAUSE" TO CONTINUE TRIAL
Snyder's written and oral motions for continuance set forth

"good cause" for continuing the trial which had been
improvidently set.
trial.

Simply put, Snyder was not prepared for a

Snyder was not granted sufficient time to engage in

discovery.3
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING AN EXPEDITED HEARING.
Prior to 1981 and the enactment of the possession bond

provision (Ut. Code Ann. §78-36-8.5 (1953 as amended)), actions
for unlawful detainer were routinely granted expedited trial
dates by the rules of practice in the Utah trial courts.

That

priority became unnecessary with the enactment of the possession
bond provisions which set a process by which a landlord could
quickly secure possession and a tenant could be heard.
The Housing Authority's citations to general rules allowing
a trial court to manage its own calendar are not useful. Ut.
Code Ann. §78-36-8.5 (1953 as amended) governs the exclusive
process to quickly present the issue of immediate possession to a
trial court.

Absent utilization of the possession bond

provision, the unlawful detainer statutes does not provide for an

3

The Housing Authority's counsel falsely represented
otherwise to the trial court (R. 29). Similarly the Housing
Authority's counsel falsely represented to the trial court that
meaningful settlement discussions had occurred (R. 29-30). No
such discussions occurred.
7

expedited trial in a case such as this.

Similarly, plaintiff's

citation to cases which pre-date the 1981 enactment of the bond
statute are not helpful.
Unquestionably, the memo from the Administrative Office of
the Court and Brent Johnson (R. 164-166) is not controlling
authority.

However, Mr. Snyder suggests that the official

position of the Administrative Office of the Court and Brent
Johnson's interpretation of the statute are entitled to more than
a little weight as persuasive authority.
The Housing Authority claims some ability of a landlord "to
move an unlawful detainer matter forward on an expedited basis''
independent of the possession bond provision.
p. 15.

Brief of Appellee,

However, the Housing Authority cites no authority for

that claim.

Furthermore, the Housing Authority cites no

authority for its claim that posting of a possession bond
"provides for an even more expedited basis for having a tenant
removed."

Brief of Appellee, p. 15.

The Housing Authority cites

no authority for the claim that the pre-1981, pre-possession bond
expedited consideration of unlawful detainer actions continued
after the enactment of the possession bond provision.

The Memo

from the Administrative Office of the Courts clearly weighs
against the Housing Authority's self serving interpretation.
That treble damages may accrue against a tenant found to be
in unlawful detainer is of no moment when discussing and

8

attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; [or] a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another."
76-5-102 (1953 as amended)).

Ut. Code Ann. §

Mr. Snyder made no attempt to do

injury.

Similarly, Mr. Snyder made no threat to do bodily

injury.

All of the facts presented at trial and now marshaled

for this Court do not establish a threat, accompanied by a show
of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury.

The mutual

unpleasantness that occurred, even punctuated with yelling and
foul language4, is not an assault.
V.

THE VALIDITY OF THE LEASE PROVISIONS WAS PRESENTED TO THE
TRIAL COURT AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The validity of the lease provisions was presented to the

trial court and is properly before this Court on appeal.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 5 2 (R. 25); Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, passim

(R. 233-248); and, at trial

(Transcript, pp. 94:23 - 95:1-9; 103:25 - 104:2).
The Housing Authority argues that it must be able to
"include additional terms and conditions in their leases which

4

The trial court orally found "[Snyder] started pointing
his finger and coming around the desk . . . He was loud, he was
upset, he was angry, his choice of words was intimidating."
Transcript at 101:2-17. The trial court did not find that Mr.
Snyder made a specific threat of physical harm instead the court
felt that Mr. Snyder's getting close to Ms. Rico, his tone of
voice and language were intimidating and threatening. Id. at
103:11-24.
10

considering a landlord's right to seek immediate possession with
a surety bond.

The risk is for the tenant to assume if he/she

wishes to challenge eviction.

That such onerous punitive damages

may accrue might justify and warrant a tenant seeking expedited
consideration.

However, that fact does not account for the trial

court's granting an expedited trial at the insistence of the
landlord absent a possession bond as occurred herein.
IV.

JOHN THOMAS SNYDER PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE INSUFFICIENT FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
As required by this Court, Snyder has marshaled the evidence

with regard to the insufficient facts presented at trial to
support his "criminal conviction" for assault.
Appellant, pp. 19-21.

Brief of

In addition, the Housing Authority has

recited in its brief the portions of the record that allegedly
support that "guilty verdict."
9.

Brief of Appellee, n

6-8, pp. 8-

All of those facts, in their entirety, do not support a

"beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal conviction for assault.
The trial court erroneously and improperly found criminal
conduct on the part of Snyder.

The evidence presented at trial

did not support a finding by a preponderance of evidence much
less beyond

a reasonable

doubt

of criminal conduct by Snyder.

The evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
criminal conduct after marshaling all facts to support the trial
court's finding.

The crime allegedly committed was assault ("an

9

are reasonable."

Brief of Appellee, p. 23-24.

However, the

provision the Housing Authority chose to include is unreasonable.
Mr. Snyder's lease provision prohibits "all illegal or criminal
activity on or near the premises" (emphasis added) (R. 7-8) . A
literal reading would justify the eviction of a tenant without a
due process administrative grievance proceeding for minor
offenses.

Transcript, p. 103:20-24.

The interpretive federal regulations do not allow such a
broad prohibition with regard to criminal activity or its
location.

The intent of the lease and relevant regulations is

not to allow eviction for minor infractions; rather, the intent
is that only certain criminal activity may be prohibited.
lease provision is too broad and thus unreasonable.

The

It is

contrary to HUD's requirements as set out in 24 CFR §
966.4(f)(12)(i).

As a result, the provision is void and invalid.

The provision, therefore, should be read as follows:
I. Resident and household members, guests and
visitors will act in a manner so as not to disturb any
neighbors peaceful enjoyment of his/her accommodations
and refrain from all illegal or Criminal activity on or
near—the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but
is not limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the
Resident, household members, guests or visitors.
Exhibit "B" attached to Complaint (R. 13) ("strike through" added
for emphasis).
Neither the lease nor the eviction notice provide for
termination of the lease based upon "criminal activity that
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threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of
the PHA's public housing premises by . . . employees of the PHA."
24 CFR § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(A) (emphasis added)(a copy of the
relevant federal regulations is attached to Brief of Appellant as
Attachment "D").
The Housing Authority does not explain the omission of said
provision in its lease with Mr. Snyder and eviction notice served
upon him.

As outlined in the Brief of Appellant, a comparison of

24 CFR § 966.4(f) (Tenant's
966.4(1)(Termination

of

obligations)

tenancy

and 24 CFR §

and eviction)

is demonstrative.

The former provides that a tenant shall not engage in:
(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
PHA's public housing premises by other residents or
employees of the PHA, or
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near
such premises.
24 CFR § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(emphasis added).

In contrast, 24 CFR § 966.4(1)(Termination of tenancy
eviction)

and

allows termination of tenancy only for

(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
PHA's public housing premises by other residents.
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near
such premises.
24 CFR § 966.4(1)(2)(ii).

Absent in the second CFR provision is

termination for threatening employees of the PHA.
lease incorporated the second provision.
12

Mr. Snyder's

Based upon the

allegations of the complaint and the eviction notice, even if
defendant had engaged in criminal conduct it was not directed
toward other tenants.
Finally, the unlawful detainer statute provides an extremely
harsh remedy.

As a result, there must be strict compliance

throughout the entire eviction process.

See generally Sovereen

v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979); Cache County v. Beus, 978
P.2d 1043 (Ut. App. 1999).

Herein, the notice of eviction

recites alleged criminal behavior against an employee.

However,

the notice of eviction refers to a lease provision prohibiting
mis-conduct toward a tenant.

At no time did Mr. Snyder engaged

in alleged mis-conduct toward a tenant.

"Strict compliance"

invalidates the eviction notice itself (the notice of eviction
describes mis-conduct against Ms. Rico, the apartment manager (an
employee), yet the lease provision cited does not prohibit misconduct toward an employee).

Therefore, the eviction notice was

defective, and Mr. Snyder's eviction was not justified on the
grounds asserted by the County Housing Authority.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION BECAUSE JOHN THOMAS
SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING. FAILURE
TO ALLOW ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW IS JURISDICTIONAL.
Mr. Snyder was entitled to an administrative hearing to

challenge his eviction as per the terms and conditions of his
lease with the County Housing Authority.
before the trial court.

This issue was raised

However, even if it were not raised
13

there, it is properly before this Court.

Jurisdictional defects

may be raised and considered at any time.

State ex rel. R.N.J.,

908 P.2d 345, 350 (Ut. App. 1995) (jurisdictional issues may be
raised for the first time on appeal); Horn v. Utah Dept of Public
Safety, 962 P.2d 95,

(Ut. App. 1998) (appellate court lacked

jurisdiction if appellant failed to exhaust administrative
remedies even if issue not raised at trial).
The Housing Authority's failure to afford Mr. Snyder a
review through the administrative grievance process, deprived the
trial court of jurisdiction to hear this matter.

The Housing

Authority contends that once it alleges that a tenant has engaged
in prohibited criminal conduct5, the issue is closed and the
tenant is not allowed access to the administrative grievance
process.

Someone other

than

the County

Housing

Authority

must

determine that criminal conduct has occurred thereby precluding
access to the grievance process.

Furthermore, such a

determination must be made before

access to the grievance process

is denied and a suit is filed.
In its Appellate Brief, back pedaling, the Housing Authority
now argues that the "trial court, not the Housing Authority, made

5

The Housing Authority asserts, "Snyder's assault on Ms.
Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority, certainly constitutes
'good cause' for eviction.'' Brief of Appellee, p. 28. Under the
lease, for a "good cause" eviction, Mr. Snyder would be allowed
to avail himself of the grievance process and an administrative
hearing!
14

the determination that Snyder engaged in the requisite criminal
activity."

Brief of Appellee, p. 29.

The defect in this

argument is that absent the Housing Authority's initial
determination that the tenant is not entitled to an
administrative grievance process, no lawsuit would have been
filed and the trial court would not have had the opportunity to
made the determination of criminal conduct.
The Housing Authority asserts that Mr. Snyder was not
entitled to a grievance hearing.
support of its assertion.

They cite 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 in

That provision is contingent on a due

process determination from HUD; one such determination was issued
to November 8, 1991 regarding Utah's eviction statutes (a copy is
attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment(see Appellee's Addendum)).
The Code of Federal Regulations provides
If HUD has issued a due process determination, a
PHA [Public Housing Authority] may exclude from the PHA
administrative grievance procedure . . . any grievance
concerning a termination of tenancy or eviction that
involves:
(A)

any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other residents
or employees of the PHA, or

(B)

any drug related criminal activity on or near
such premises.

(iv) If HUD has issued the due process determination,
the PHA may evict the occupants . . . through the

judicial eviction procedures which are the
subject
of the determination.
In this case, the PHA is
15

not required to provide an opportunity for a
hearing under the PHA's administrative grievance
procedure.
24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (1999) (emphasis added).
The exclusion from the administrative grievance procedure
is, therefore, strictly linked to the judicial procedure that is
the subject of the due process determination.

In Utah, HUD's due

process determination of the judicial eviction procedure "does
not apply where plaintiff obtains possession by filing a
possession bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8."

HUD Utah

Due Process Determination, November 8, 1991, p. 2, n.l (attached
to Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment(see Appellee's Addendum)).

Under Utah law, the

Forcible Detainer statute authorizes an expedited hearing only
when the plaintiff files a possession bond and the defendant
requests an expedited hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5
(1953 as amended).

By implication, HUD's due process

determination does not apply to any expedited eviction
procedures.

As a result, Mr. Snyder should have been able to

avail himself of the administrative grievance procedure prior to
eviction.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Wherefore, this Court should determine that 1) the trial
court erred in granting County Housing Authority an expedited

16

trial absent the posting of a possession bond; 2) Mr. Snyder did
not engage in criminal activity in violation of the lease
agreement and was not in unlawful detainer of the premises; 3)
County Housing Authority was not justified in terminating Mr.
Snyder's Lease, 4) the Judgment against Mr. Snyder is invalid;
and, 5) that Mr. Snyder's lease be reinstated.
In the alternative, this Court should determine that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction and that Mr. Snyder is entitled
to avail himself of the administrative grievance procedure prior
to termination of his lease.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of MARCH 2001
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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